Since supersingular elliptic curve isogenies are one of the several candidate sources of hardness for building post-quantum cryptographic primitives, the research of efficient signature schemes based on them is still a hot topic. In this paper, we present a many-time signature scheme based on the hash function from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies over the finite field F p 2 where p = 2 521 − 1. Our signature scheme achieves smaller signature sizes relative to other post-quantum signature schemes based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies, such as Galbraith's signature schemes (AsiaCrypt 2017) and Yoo's scheme (FC 2017). The structure of our scheme follows that of the hash-based signature scheme submitted to National Institute of Standards and Technology for post-quantum cryptography in 2018 with some modifications. To complete the construction, we firstly apply the method of Weil restriction to improve the efficiency of hash function from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies by approximately 30%, then propose a new Winternitz one-time signature scheme based on the hash function. Finally, we implement the signature scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent research area for post-quantum cryptography is from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies [1] . These cryptosystems [2] - [4] are based on the difficulty of finding a path in the isogeny graphs of supersingular elliptic curves. Since the only known quantum algorithm for the problem has exponential complexity [5] , it may be suitable for building post-quantum cryptography.
For the study of signature schemes based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies, building a secure and efficient signature scheme is still a hot topic. Since Jao and De [2] proposed a key exchange protocol based on supersingular isogenies, some signature schemes based on it emerged one after another. Jao and Soukharev [6] gave an undeniable signature, Sun et al. [7] presented a designated verifier signature, Yoo et al. [4] designed a quantum-resistant signature and Galbraith et al. [8] constructed two signatures DFJP+FS and DFJP+U which were against classical and quantum adversaries, respectively. According to [8] , it is shown that the protocol [2] might be dangerous in certain contexts, since
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Tony Thomas. it used small isogeny degrees and revealed auxiliary points. Hence, Galbraith et al. [8] provided another two schemes Sec3+FS and Sec3+U which both relied on the difficulty of computing the endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic curve. This difficulty has heuristic classical complexity of O(p 1/2 ) bit operations, and quantum complexity O(p 1/4 ) bit operations.
Since Castryck et al. [8] proposed a commutative key exchange protocol based on the class group from supersingular isogenies, De Feo and Galbraith [10] provided a new signature scheme based on the protocol. Deru et al. [11] speeded up the signature scheme. By relying on the programmes proposed by Kleinjung [12] and working over the maximal order, Beullens et al. [13] found the generator of the class group and constructed a new signature scheme, which was 300 times faster than the optimized version [11] . Note that Bonnetain and Schrottenloher [14] and Peikert [15] reassessed the security of the key exchange based on the class group and found that the CSIDH failed to achieve 64 bits of quantum security.
Up to now, these signature schemes mentioned above are constructed from identification protocols by using the Fiat-Shamir transform [16] against classical adversaries, or Unruh transform [17] against quantum adversaries, respectively. In these identification protocols, the prover and verifier need to interact at least λ times where λ is the security parameter. As the isogeny does not have rich algebraic structure and the interactive process takes one bit at a time, the efficiency of the corresponding signature schemes is relatively slow.
It is well known that one signature scheme can be constructed not only based on identification protocols, but also based on cryptographic hash functions which combines with tree structures.
For the hash-based digital signature schemes, there are two schemes submitted to National Institute of Standards and Technology [18] , [19] in response to their call for postquantum cryptography standardization. These schemes are based on hash functions such as SHA-2, SHA-3, etc. If these hash functions can be replaced by ones which are provable secure under the assumptions of computationally hard problems such as those from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies, the security of these schemes would be increased.
In 2009, Charles et al. [20] proposed an expander hash (CGL), which is based on the isogeny graphs of supersingular elliptic curves over finite fields. According to [21, Proposition 15] , the CGL hash suffered from a collision attack when the initial curve is special. Namely, its endomorphism ring is known [21, Proposition 15] . Doliskani et al. [20] proposed a variant of the expander hash (JGP) that was more efficient than the original CGL algorithm. Besides, in order to prevent this attack, the starting elliptic curve is chosen randomly such that the endomorphism ring computation problem is hard [21] .
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we firstly optimize the hash function from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies by taking advantage of the Weil restriction. This trick can transform all the arithmetic operations over F p 2 into those over F p , which speeds up the computation of hash function by about 30%. Then we propose a Winternitz one-time signature scheme based on the hash function and utilize the structure of hash-based signature to change the one-time signature into many-time signature. The scheme has shorter signature size than other post-quantum signature schemes based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. Finally, we implement the signature scheme.
B. ORGANISATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We shall briefly introduce the preliminaries in Section II. In Section III, we optimize the hash function based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies, propose a keyed one-way function based on the hash function and construct a new Winternitz onetime signature scheme based on the keyed one-way function. A many-time signature scheme based on hash functions from the supersingular elliptic curve isogenies is presented in Section IV. We give the efficiency analysis in Section V and a brief conclusion in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section sets the stage by reviewing some background about supersingular elliptic curve isogenies and Kummer surfaces, keyed one-way function [23] and signature schemes based on hash functions [19] .
A. SUPERSINGULAR ELLIPTIC CURVE ISOGENIES AND KUMMER SURFACES
We summarize the required background about isogenies according to the theory in [24] . Let E, E be two elliptic curves over a finite field F q . An isogeny ψ is a non-constant morphism E → E of elliptic curves that preserves the group structure. The degree of an isogeny ψ is the degree of ψ as a morphism. An isogeny of degree l is called an l-isogeny. If ψ is separable, then degψ = kerψ. If there is a separable isogeny between two curves, we say that they are isogenous. Tate's theorem is that two curves E, E over F q are isogenious if and only if E(F q ) = E (F q ). A separable isogeny can be identified with its kernel [25] . Given a subgroup G of E, we can use Vélu's formulae [26] to explicitly obtain an isogeny ψ : E → E with kernel G such that E ∼ = E/G. Given a prime l, the torsion group E[l] contains exactly l + 1 cyclic subgroups of order l, each of which corresponds to a different isogeny.
An isogeny ψ : E → E such that E = E is called an endomorphism. The set of endomorphisms of an elliptic curve, denoted by End(E), has a ring structure which is either an order in a quadratic imaginary field or a maximal order in a quaternion algebra. In the first case, we say that the curve is ordinary, whereas in the second case we say that the curve is supersingular.
It can be shown that every supersingular elliptic curve can be defined over F p 2 , thus its j-invariant is over F p 2 . Although there are N p := p 12 + p supersingular j-invariants, with p = 0, 1, 1, 2 when p = 1, 5, 7, 11 mod 12 respectively, we are not aware of an efficient method to encode each of these j-invariants into log 2 p bits, so we represent a supersingular j-invariant with 2 log 2 p bits. For any prime l = p, one can construct a so-called isogeny graph, where each vertex is associated to a supersingular j-invariant, and an edge between two vertices is associated to an l-isogeny between the corresponding vertices. Isogeny graphs are regular with degree l + 1; they are undirected since any isogeny from j 1 to j 2 corresponds to a dual isogeny from j 2 to j 1 . Isogeny graphs are also very good expander graphs G l [27] . Next, we give three hard problems in G l according to [22] . Let n = log 2 p. For a prime l = p, denote by G l the graph of supersingular elliptic curves over F p 2 .
Problem 1: Find curves E 1 , E 2 ∈ G l and two distinct isogenies φ 1 , φ 2 : E 1 → E 2 of degrees l rn and l sn for some integers r, s > 0.
Problem 2: Given a curve E ∈ G l , find an endomorphism ''φ ∈ End(E)/Z'' of degree l rn for some even r > 0.
Problem 3: Given curves E 1 , E 2 ∈ G l , find an isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 of degree l rn for some integer r > 0.
In [22] , it had been shown that Problem 1 is equivalent to Problem 2 in G l , while finding a solution to Problem 3 implies a solution to Problem 1. Due to Biasse et al. [5] , Problem 3 has heuristic classical complexity of O(p 1 2 ) bit operations, and quantum complexity O(p 1 4 ). For a genus-2 curve C over F q , J C is its Jacobian group, the quotient J C /{±1} is called Kummer surface. There exists fast Kummer surface K Sqr , which has efficient arithmetic operations and isogeny computations. By leveraging a linear projective isomorphism between J C /{±1} and K Sqr according to [28] , all the arithmetic operations on J C /{±1} can be transformed into those on K Sqr . For the evaluation of isogenies, Costello [31] presents a fast method to optimize the (2, 2)-isogenies over F p and apply the Weil restriction to transfer the evaluation of isogenies on Montgomery curves over F p 2 into the evaluation on Kummer surfaces K Sqr over F p .
B. KEY ONE-WAYNESS
Keyed One-Way Function: A keyed one-way function family F n = {F k : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n |k ∈ {0, 1} n } are parameterized by a key k ∈ {0, 1} n and the security parameter n [35] . The key one-wayness of the function family can be defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Key one-wayness(KOW) [23] ): Let F n be a family of keyed one-way functions as above. We call F n is (t, ) key one-wayness, if the success probability
of any adversary A that runs in time t is at most .
C. SIGNATURES
A signature scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms (Gen, Sign, Verify) [35] . We use the standard security notion of existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen messages attacks (EU-ACMA) [36] , which is defined using a game between a challenger and a forger. Namely, a forger can ask a signing oracle Sign(sk, .) for polynomial many signatures of messages of his choice. Then a successful attack is considered if the forger is able to produce a valid pair of message and signature for a message different from those queried to the oracle. The specific process is as follows: Definition 2 (EU-ACMA): Setup: The challenger runs Gen to output a pair of keys (pk, sk), and give the public key pk to the forger.
Queries: The forger A adaptively requests at most q s messages M 1 , ..., M q s . The challenger responds to the ith query with a valid signature σ i where i ∈ {1, ..., q s }.
Output: Finally, the forger A outputs a valid messagesignature pair (M * , σ * ) and wins the game if M * / ∈ M i for all i ∈ {1, ..., q s }.
The advantage of the forger A is defined as
The probability is taken over the coin tosses of the Gen, Sign and A.
The signature is (t, ε, q)-EU-ACMA if there is no t-time adversary that succeeds with probability ≥ ε after making ≤ q signature oracle queries.
A (t, ε, 1)-EU-ACMA secure signature scheme is called a one-time signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable under the 1-adaptively chosen message attack.
D. HASH-BASED SIGNATURE SCHEMES
In this subsection, we mainly review the hash-based signature scheme submitted to NIST for post-quantum cryptography in 2018 [19] . The scheme combines some basic blocks such as a Winternitz one-time signature scheme, a subsets-based scheme, secret key caching, as well as batch signing with a hyper-tree construction, which achieves the goal of signing many messages per key pair.
1) WINTERNITZ ONE-TIME SIGNATURE SCHEME (WOTS):
The WOTS uses one string of the signing key to sign several bits of the message digest simultaneously. The key point is to iteratively use a one-way function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n on a secret input. For a message digest M of n bits, one firstly chooses parameters l 1 and w such that l 1 · log 2 w = n, then decomposes M into l 1 chunks of log 2 w bits (x 1 , ..., x l 1 ). Secondly, he computes C = l 1 i=1 (w − x i ), and decomposes C into l 2 chunks (c 1 , ..., c l 2 ), each of which is of log 2 w bits, and appends (c 1 , ..., c l 2 ) to x to form b = (x 1 , ..., x l 1 , c 1 , ..., c l 2 ) = (b 1 , ..., b l ) where l = l 1 + l 2 . The secret key consists of l n-bits strings (s 1 , ..., s l ) and the public key is (F w−1 (s i )) 1≤i≤l . The signer issues (y i ) 1≤i≤l = (F b i (s i )) 1≤i≤l as the one-time signature of M . Verification is done by computing F w−1−b i (y i ) and comparing the result with the public key element F w−1 (s i ) for i from 1 to l. In order to reduce the size of public key, the L-tree construction is used. It uses these public keys as leaves, and generates the internal nodes with a hash function. Nevertheless, if the number of a level in this tree is an odd, the rightmost node is lifted up one level. The root of the tree is then used as the public key pk. We call the invariant WOTS+. The security of the WOTS+ mainly relies on the one-wayness of F and collision-resistance of hash functions.
2) PRNG TO OBTAIN A RANDOM SUBSET FROM A TREE (PORST)
The signature constructed by the PORST is a few-time signature scheme, it uses a pseudo-random function to obtain a random subset from a key set which acts as the leaves of a tree. The secret key is n-bits strings (s 1 , ..., s t ). The public key pk is the root of a Merkle tree which uses these t values as leaves and uses one hash function to compute internal nodes. For a message digest m of n bits, using a pseudo-random function G, the signer takes m and an address parameter A as input, outputs k elements from (s 1 , ..., s t ) as a part of the signature. Meanwhile, the signer computes an optimal authentication path for the k elements in the Merkle tree as the other part of the signature. Verification is done by computing the root of the Merkle tree and comparing the result with the public key. The security of the PORST signature scheme mainly relies on the hardness of the subset-resilience problem and the collision resistance of the hash function.
3) GRAVITY-SPHINCS
Gravity-SPHINCS [19] is a many-time signature based on hash functions. It includes four parts: key caching of height c; d layers of WOTS+ instances (each of which includes a Merkle tree of height h and a WOTS+); PORST signature and batch messages of height b at the bottom of the hypertree. This structure is shown in FIGURE. 1
The process is taken as follows. Firstly, the secret keys are two n-bits values seed and salt, the seed is used for pseudorandom key generation and the salt is used to generate an unpredictable index and pseudo-random values to randomize the message hash. The public key pk is the root of a Merkle tree of height h + c whose leaves are WOTS+ public keys. The first step of the signature is to gather all the messages and to compute a Merkle tree from their respective hashes by applying the batch signing, then the root m of the Merkle tree is the message signed by PORST signature. The authentication path A batch of the corresponding message M e , as well as its index e (i.e. the index of the message required signed) are as part of the Gravity-SPHINCS signature. The second step is the PORST signature, which uses the secret key seed and an address A to generate t values as the secret keys of the PORST signature, and the signature of m is (σ d , oct). The public key of PORST signature is regarded as the messages for the next signature. The third step repeats WOTS+ and constructs Merkle trees for d times, the secret keys for WOTS+ are generated by the secret key seed and an address A. Then the d time signatures are (σ d−1 , Auth d−1 , ..., σ 0 , Auth 0 ). At the last step, we need to compute 2 c+h WOTS+ public keys and the authentication path Auth h+c until we reach the root of the hyper-tree. The Auth c is to remove the first h nodes of the authentication path Auth h+c . Then the signature is σ = (s, i, b i , σ d , oct, σ d−1 , Auth d−1 , ..., σ 0 , Auth 0 , Auth c ). Given a signature σ and the public key pk, the verification process consists of recomputing the root of the Merkle tree for batch messages, the root of the Merkle tree for PORST signature, the roots of the Merkle trees for WOTS+ for d times until reaching the root of the hyper-tree. If all verifications succeed and the root of the top tree equals pk, then the signature is accepted. The security of Gravity-SPHINCS can be proved by using the product composition [37] which combines the security of each part together.
III. HASH FUNCTION AND KEYED ONE-WAY FUNCTION FROM SUPERSINGULAR ELLIPTIC CURVE ISOGENIES AND WINTERNITZ ONE-TIME SIGNATURE
In this section, we optimize the hash function and present a keyed one-way function based on hash function from supersingular isogenies. Basing on these two function, we propose a Winternitz one-time signature and prove its security.
A. HASH FUNCTION AND KEYED ONE-WAY FUNCTION FROM SUPERSINGULAR ISOGENIES
Doliskani et al. [22] proposed a hash function H (E 0 , m) in Algorithm 2 from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. The function takes an initial curve E 0 and arbitrary length message m as input and is constructed by leveraging the Merkle-Damg • ard structure [29] . The compression function h(E, m, c) in Algorithm 2 is called by taking a supersingular elliptic curve E, an n−bit message m and an index c as inputs, computing 2 n -isogenies and outputing a supersingular elliptic curve E .
We utilize the trick of the Weil restriction [31] to optimize the compression function. Specifically, in Algorithm 1,
Step 1 obtains two independent points of E[2 n ] as generators canonically according to the input index c and a fixed table T 1 (or T 2). Step 2 computes the kernel generator point R of an isogeny. These two steps are the same as those in [22] .
Step 3 and Step 4 convert the supersingular elliptic curve E and the kernel point R on E over F p 2 into the Kummer surface K Sqr and the corresponding point R K Sqr on K Sqr over F p . They make use of Scholten's construction [30] to change the Montgomery curve E into the general Kummer surface J C , and then leverage the isomorphism map mentioned in [32] to convert the general Kummer surface J C into fast Kummer surface K Sqr . Thus an isogeny φ can be evaluated over a prime field F p at Step 5, which is similar to the approach in [33] . [22] . By comparison, our function has been speeded up by 30%, thus the hash function in Algorithm 2 can be further improved by 30% on average.
Input : A supersingular curve E 0 , a message m Output : A curve E 2 1: Pad the message m to get m = m 0 ||m 1 ||...||m k , where each block m i is n bits 2: c = 0 3:
The hash function H (E 0 , m) is also proved to be preimageresistant and collision-resistant when the initial curve E 0 is chosen randomly.
Theorem 1 (Preimage Resistance (PR) [22] ): If there is an efficient algorithm for finding preimages in the hash family, then there is an efficient algorithm for Problem 3.
Theorem 2 (Collision Resistance (CR) [22] ): If there is an efficient algorithm for finding collisions in the hash family, then there is an efficient algorithm for Problem 1 and Problem 2. [22] with chained (2,2)-isogenies on Kummer surfaces over F p [31] .
Keyed One-Way Function Based on the Hash Function:
The keyed one-way function is a keyed hash function in essence. If there exists a hash function, it is easy to construct a keyed hash function [35] . Therefore, our keyed one-way function H kow can be defined as H k (E 0 , x) = H (E 0 , k||x), i.e., computing a hash function based on supersingular isogeny with the secret key k as part of the input. The key one-wayness can be reduced to the preimage resistance of the hash function based on supersingular isogeny.
B. WINTERNITZ ONE-TIME SIGNATURE (WOTS)
The Winternitz one-time signature based on the keyed oneway function is a variant of WOTS [23] . Now, we use a keyed hash function from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies H kow to specify it with some modifications.
1) KEY GENERATION
Firstly, we choose the Winternitz parameter w = 2 r ∈ N, t ≥ 1, to define the compression level. Next we choose a random x $ ← − {0, 1} n and a random supersingular elliptic curve E 0 ∈ {0, 1} 2n . The signature secret key consists of l bit strings of length n chosen uniformly at random sk = (sk 1 , ..., sk l ) $ ← − {0, 1} {n·l} , where l = l 1 + l 2 , l 1 = n/r and l 2 = ( log 2 n − log 2 r + r)/r . Every element of the public key is computed by iteratively using the keyed hash function from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies H (E 0 , k||x) for w − 1 times, where the output of the i iteration is the key of the i + 1 iteration, i.e., k i+1 = H (E 0 , k i ||x). Therefore, the public key can be computed by pk = (pk 0 , pk 1 , ..., pk l )
When constructing an L−tree as in Section II.D, the leaves are pk 1 , ..., pk l . Let the root node of this L−tree be E 0 , the public key could be redefined as pk = (E 0 , E 0 , x).
2) SIGN
We describe how to sign an m−bit message M = (M 1 , ..., M l 1 ) given in base-w representation, i.e., M i ∈ {0, ..., w − 1} for i = 1, ..., l 1 . We begin by computing the checksum C = l 1 i=0 (w − 1 − M i ) and representing it to base w as C = (C 1 , ..., C l 2 ). The length of the base-w representation of C is at most l 2 since C ≤ l 1 (w − 1). Then we set B = (b 1 , b 2 , ..., b l ) = M ||C (we can use the function checksumed(M ) to describe the process later). The signature of message M is computed as
3) VERIFY
Given a message M and signature σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ l ), the verifier first computes the base-w string B = (b 1 , b 2 , ..., b l ) as described above. Then he 1. computes (pk 1 , pk 2 , ..., pk l ) = (H w−1−b 1 (E 0 , σ 1 ||pk 0 ), ...,
2. recomputes the root pk of the L − tree and checks pk ? = E . Now, we give the security analyses of the WOTS, as well as the WOTS+ which uses a so-called L−tree to compress the l values of the WOTS public key into a single 2n−bit string. Theorem 3: If H kow is a (t KOW , Insec KOW (H kow )) keyed one-way function, then WOTS is existentially unforgeable with
where l and w are defined above and the upper bound k is denoted as follows: for each pair (E 0 , x), there exist at most k − 1 different curves k 1 , ..., k k−1 such that H (E 0 , k i ||x) = H (E 0 , k||x) for i = 1, ..., k − 1. Only then the σ α in the forged signature might yield a key k such that H (E 0 , k ||x) = y holds. We now compute the success probability of B. Assume the forger queries the signing oracle. The probability of b α ≥ β in Line 6 is at least (lw) −1 . This is due to the checksum which guarantees that not all of the b i are zero simultaneously. The probability in Line 8 that the forger succeeds is at least Insec EU −CMA by definition. The probability holds under the condition that the public key computed in Line 3 resembles a regular public key which is the case if there exists a key k such that H β (E 0 , k||x) = y. This happens with probability at least 1/k β . The probability of b α < β in Line 9 is at least (lw) −1 . The probability that y = H (E 0 , k ||x) holds in Line 11 is at least 1/k w−1−β . This is because there exists k w−1 keys mapping x to pk α after w − 1 iterations and only k β of these keys map x to y after β iterations. Therefore, we have
Theorem 4 [19] : Let H kow and H cr be depicted as above. We consider the following resources ξ : the time τ , the number of queries to the signature scheme q and the number of queries to H kow and H cr respectively q H kow and q H cr .
The unforgeability of the WOTS+ based on H kow and H cr can be bounded by the unforgeability of WOTS and the collision resistance of H cr , i.e.,
where l, w and k are defined above, q = 1, q H cr = q H kow + 2(l − 1), τ = τ + c(l − 1) and τ = τ + c(w − 1)l for some constant c.
IV. SIGNATURE SCHEMES
In this section, we exploit those constructions presented in Section III to give a new signature based on hash functions from supersingular elliptic curves isogenies. Firstly, we give basic parameters and basic functions used in our signature schemes. Secondly, exploiting these hash functions, we define some internal algorithms that are the building blocks of our signatures. Lastly, we propose a new signature scheme.
A. PUBLIC PARAMETERS
The signature scheme from supersingular isogenies requires some parameters which are also defined in the scheme [19] .
• the message space M , which is a subset of bit string {0, 1} * , • the batching height b, a non-negative integer, • the PORS set size t, a positive power of two, • the PORS subset size k, a positive integer such that k ≤ t,
• the Winternitz depth w, a power of two such that w ≥ 2, • the Winternitz width l = µ+ log 2 µ(w−1)/ log 2 w +1 where µ = n/ log 2 w ,
• the Merkle height h in each WOTS+ instance (i.e. WOTS+ with a Merkle tree), a non-negative integer,
• the layers d of WOTS+ instances, a non-negative integer,
• the key caching height c, a non-negative integer.
B. PRIMITIVES
Our signature scheme mainly uses the following three functions. a supersingular curve. This function is used for computing WOTS+ signature.
A pseudorandom function G(seed, a i ): {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n takes as input a seed and an address a i , outputs a secret key. This function is used for generating secret keys of WOTS+ and PORST signature. For example, we can take a variant of AES [34] as the pseudorandom function.
Remark: It is worth nothing that is the computation of hash function H (E 0 , x 1 ||x 2 ) for the construction of tree which takes an initial curve E 0 , two nodes x 1 and x 2 represented hash values as input. Since x 1 and x 2 are also curves over F p 2 = F p / x 2 + 1 , and can be represented as x 1 = a 11 + a 12 i and x 2 = a 21 + a 22 i, we always regard x 1 ||x 2 as 4 message blocks a 11 ||a 12 ||a 21 ||a 22 , where each block is n bits.
C. INTERNAL ALGORITHMS
In this part, we describe some internal algorithms with the same notation as in [19] . TABLE 2 presented some functions similar to those in [19] , we put the explicit definitions in Appendix B. These functions described below are mainly used for Winternitz signature.
Winternitz Public Key Generation (The Function WOTS
, 1} 2n takes as input a supersingular curve E 0 , a secret value seed, an address A and a random value x, and outputs the associated Winternitz public key p as follows:
• Let address A i = incr − addr(A, i − 1) for i = 1, .., l and pad A i to n bits.
• s i = G(seed, A i ) and pad s i to n bits for i = 1, ..., l.
• Compute the public values pk i = H w−1 (E 0 , s i ||x) for i = 1, ..., l.
• Compute p ← L − tree(E 0 , pk 1 , ..., pk l ).
Winternitz Signature: The function WOTS+:
, 1} 2nl takes as input a supersingular curve E 0 , a secret value seed, an address A, a hash m and a random value x and outputs the associated Winternitz signature σ ∈ {0, 1} 2nl as described in Section III. B:
• Exploit the function checksumed(m) to split the hash m into l blocks b 1 ||b 2 ||...||b l .
• Let address A i = incr − addr(A, i − 1) and pad A i to n bits for i = 1, .., l.
Winternitz Public Key Extraction (The Function WOTS+ Extractpk):
takes as input an initial curve E 0 , a hash m, a signature σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ l ) and a random value x, and outputs the associated Winternitz public key p. The details is as follows:
• Compute the public value p i ← H w−b i −1 (E 0 , σ i ||x) for i ∈ {1, ..., l}.
• Compute p ← L − tree(E 0 , p 1 , ..., p l ).
D. THE SIGNATURE BASED ON SUPERSINGULAR ELLIPTIC CURVE ISOGENIES
We adopt the optimal Gravity-SPHINCS scheme proposed by Aumasson et al [19] , and replace the hash functions, keyed one-way function, batch signature, PORST signature, WOTS+ instances with those from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies and make some changes. Key Generation: To generate keys, we first choose a random value x $ ← − {0, 1} n for the computation of keyed one-way functions, and select a secret value seed to deduce the secret keys of WOTS+ and PORST signature. To generate the public key, we compute a Merkle tree of high c + h and take the root node as part of public key. The process is as follows:
• For i ∈ {1, ..., 2 c+h }, generate Winternitz public keys A i = make − addr(0, i),
• Compute the root of a Merkle tree with 2 c+h leaves and take it as part of a public key,
The private key is seed ∈ {0, 1} n and the public key is
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Signing: Given a message M e ∈ {M 1 , ..., M i }, we need four steps to sign it. They are batch signing, PORST signing, WOTS+ instances and key caching.
For a sequence of messages (M 1 , ..., M i ) with 0 < i ≤ 2 b , the batch signing is as follows.
• For j ∈ {1, ..., i}, compute the message hash
• For the message M e , find the authentication path
Sign the root m and take A batch and e as a part of our signature.
At the dth layer, we generate a Merkle tree of height log 2 t and target at k leaves chosen from t leaves for the PORST signing.
• Compute a hyper-tree index λ ∈ N and k distinct indices − addr(d, 0) , -compute A i = incr − addr(a, i) and pad A i to n bits, -compute s i = G(seed, A i ).
For j = 1 to k, -set the signature value σ j = s x j , -compute the authentication octopus and root as (oct, p) ← Octopus−auth log 2 t (E 0 , s 1 , ..., s t , x 1 , ..., x k ). Then the signature is σ d,w = (σ 1 , ..., σ k , oct, p). For i ∈ {d−1, ..., 0}, we do the WOTS+ instances as follows.
• Set the address A i = make − address(i, λ). • Sign the message p.
The key caching is performed as follows.
• For 0 ≤ u < 2 c+h , compute the WOTS+ public key, -let the address be A u = make − addr(0, u), -compute p u ← WOTS + genpk(E 0 , seed, A u , x).
• Compute the Merkle authentication (a 1 , ..., a h+c ) ← Merkle − auth h+c (E 0 , p 0 , ..., p 2 c+h −1 , 2 h λ)
• Set A cache ← (a h+1 , ..., a h+c ). The signature is A batch , σ d,w , oct, σ d−1,w , A d−1 , . .., σ 0,w , A 0 , A cache ).
Verification: V takes as input a hash M e , public keys E 0 and a signature (e, A batch , σ d,w , oct, σ d−1,w , A d−1 , ..., σ 0,w , A 0 , A cache ) and verifies it as follows:
• Compute the root of batched messages m ← Merkle − extract b (M e , E 0 , e, A batch ).
• Compute the PORST public key p, -compute the hyper-tree index and random subset,
-compute the PORST public key, given the oct, σ d,w , (x 1 , ..., x k ) and E 0 , compute p ← Octopus − auth log 2 t,k (E 0 , oct, σ d,w , (x 1 , ..., x k )).
• If p =⊥, then abort and return 0.
• Verify the WOTS+ instances, for i ∈ {d − 1, ..., 0} do the following, -compute the WOTS+ public key
The result is 1 if p = E 0 , and 0 otherwise.
E. PARAMETER SIZES
In order to achieve λ bits of post-quantum security (see. Sec.2.1), we can set log 2 p ≈ 4λ over F p 2 . Note that all supersingular curves are defined over F p 2 and represented in Montgomery form By 2 = x 3 + Ax 2 + x where the A-coefficient suffices for the computations of isogenous curves. Meanwhile, a point on the curve can be represented only by its x-coordinate to complete the computations of scalar multiplications and isogenies. Since each field element requires 8λ bits over F p 2 , in both cases, we only need one field element.
Public Keys: The public key includes the initial curve E 0 , the root node E 0 and the random x, which require 20λ bits of storage.
Private Keys: The private key can be stored as an element seed ∈ {0, 1} 4λ , requiring 4λ bits.
Signatures: Our signature has the form (e, A batch , σ d,w , oct, σ d−1,w , A d−1 , ..., σ 0,w , A 0 , A cache ).
According to the signature scheme, these authentications A batch , A i (0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1) and A cache separately include b curves, h curves and c curves. The Octopus authentication oct at most includes k(log 2 t − log 2 k ) curves. σ d,w and σ i,w (0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1) include k curves and l curves, respectively. The index e is a b-bit number. Thus the entire signature has size roughly
bits at most. For instance, to achieve 128 bits of post-quantum security over F p 2 , the size of p is at least 521 bits, the PORST set size t is at least 16 bits and subset size k = 28. Other parameters can be set flexibly according to the number of signatures. In order to achieve the capacity of signing 2 64 messages per key pair, we can set b = 0, h = 14, d = 4, c = 8, w = 2 4 , then the signature requires 12λ = 962808 bits at most.
Since we have shown the security of WOTS+, the security of the whole scheme can be proved in the same way as the method in [19] , we will not go into the details here.
V. IMPLICATIONS RESULTS AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
We used Visual Studio 2015 in Windows 10 on a computer with 2.90GH Intel Core i7-7700T CPU and 8G RAM to implement 1 our scheme. The details were partly referred to the implementation process of the signature scheme based on hash function proposed by Aumasson et al. [19] and OpenSSL 1.0.0e for the implementation of prime field F p where p = 2 521 − 1. The initial curve E 0 is chosen by starting a random walk from a special curve y 2 = x 3 + 6x 2 + x. Next, we compare our scheme, which can sign 2 50 messages per key pair, with the signature schemes based on supersingular elliptic curve in TABLE 3. In the light of the introduction mentioned before, DFJP+U, Sec4+U as well as the Yoo's schemes [4] attain 128-bit quantum security levels, while DFJP+FS, Sec4+ FS, SeaSign and CSI-Fish schemes attain 128-bit classical security levels. The results in TABLE 3 show that the signature size of our scheme is shorter than those post-quantum signature schemes based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. Thus, when there are fewer messages required signatures, our scheme has more obvious advantages.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a more efficient hash function from supersingular elliptic curve isogeny. Based on the hash function, a new signature scheme is designed. In contrast to other postquantum signature schemes based on supersingular elliptic curve isogeny, the scheme has smaller signature size. Furthermore, all our operations are over finite fields F p 2 where p = 2 521 −1. It is well known that the addition, multiplication, squaring and inversion operations on it are fast.
The major limitation lies in the fact that the efficient representation of supersingular elliptic curve, i.e., the output length of our hash function, significantly affects the signature size. In our setting, each supersingular elliptic curve is represented in terms of j−invariants and needs 2n bits over F p 2 with log 2 p = n. Theoretically, there are about p/12 supersingular j−invariants [24] , each one can be represented by n bits. Future work should be done to investigate the efficient representation of the elliptic curve j−invariants over F p 2 .
APPENDIX

A. TRANSFORMATION BETWEEN E AND K SQR
Converting the Montgomery curve E α : y 2 = x(x − α)(x − 1/α) to squared Kummer surface needs three steps.
The first step is to convert the Montgomery curve E α into Jacobian J C α . According to Proposition 1 [31] , the Weil restriction of scalars of E α (F p 2 ) with respect to F p 2 /F p is (2, 2)-isogenies to the Jacobian J C α of
Write β = β 0 + β 1 i and γ = γ 0 + γ 1 i with
Converting a Montgomery curve
costs one square root, one squaring, one inversion and two multiplications over F p 2 . Computing γ and β cost two square roots, one inversion, one multiplication and one squaring and z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ,z 5 , z 6 cost 6 inversions and 6 multiplications. Thus this step in total costs 3 square roots, 7 inversions, 9 multiplications and two squarings, i.e., 4138 M + 5S.
The second step is to convert the curve C α into the Rosenhain form C λ,µ,ν :
) 3 )
with e 2 = ac(a − c)(a − νc)(a − µc)(a − λc), and
This step only needs to compute λ, µ and ν, which costs 308 M + 2S. The third step is to convert the Rosenhain form into the squared Kummer surface K Sqr , i.e.,
K Sqr
:
This step needs to compute µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 , µ 4 and F, G, H , which costs 1450M + 7S. Henceforth, converting a Montgomery curve E over F p 2 to Kummer surfaces K Sqr Over F p costs 5896M + 14S.
2) MAPPING THE POINT R ON E INTO THE POINT R K SQR on K Sqr
Mapping a point R on E into the point R K Sqr on K Sqr needs two steps: The first step is to map the point R on E into the divisor R J Cα on J C α . This can be performed by the mapping [31] η :
where ψ, ρ and τ are defined as follows:
with E : y 2 = (x−r 1 )(x−r 2 )(x−r 3 ), r 1 = (α−1/α) p−1 , r 2 = α p−1 , r 3 = 1/α p−1 ,and β 2 = r 3 − r 2 . Computing ψ costs 4M + 1563S + I .
The second step is to use Algorithm 3 in [32] to translate the point on J C α (F p ) into K Sqr (F p ), which costs 12m + 1s + 11a. Thus mapping the point R on E into the point R K Sqr on K Sqr needs 243M + 3655S.
3) MAPPING THE POINT R K SQR ON K Sqr INTO THE POINT R ON E
Firstly, we map the point R K Sqr on K Sqr into R J Cα on J C α (F p ) by Algorithm 8 in [32] , which costs 243M + 12S. Then we use the mapping η to map the point R J Cα on J C α into the point R on E.
where ρ and ψ −1 are defined as follows:
and
The map η needs 478M + 4S. Thus mapping the point R K Sqr on K Sqr into the point R on E costs 721M + 16S.
4) OPERATIONS ON KUMMER SURFACES
When converting the Montgomery curves into Kummer surfaces, the scalar multiplications and isogeny computations are all calculated on Kummer surfaces and are comprised of three sub-operations. Define H : P 3 → P 3 as the 4-way Hadamard transform in P 3 , i.e., H : (l 1 : l 2 : l 3 : l 4 ) → (l 1 + l 2 + l 3 + l 4 : l 1 + l 2 − l 3 − l 4 :
together with the coordinate squaring operation S : P 3 → P 3 , as S : (l 1 : l 2 : l 3 : l 4 ) → ((l 2 1 : l 2 2 : l 2 3 : l 2 4 )) and the coordinate scaling operation C d 1 :d 2 :d 3 :d 4 : P 3 → P 3 , as C d 1 :d 2 :d 3 :d 4 : (l 1 : l 2 : l 3 : l 4 ) → (l 1 /d 1 : l 2 /d 2 : l 3 /d 3 : l 4 /d 4 ) = (π 1 l 1 : π 2 l 2 : π 3 l 3 : π 4 l 4 )
where π i = d 1 d 2 d 3 d 4 /d i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. It follows that performing the Hadamard transform needs at most 8 field additions, the coordinate squaring operation needs at most 4 field squarings and the coordinate scaling operation needs at most 10 field multiplications.
Computing (2, 2)-isogenies between Kummer surfaces were derived in [31] . Like the general case as in [31] , the 2-isogeny corresponds to 2-torsion point which is not (0, 0) on Montgomery curve, the corresponding (2,2)-isogeny can be computed by finding a point Q ∈ K Sqr of order 4 such that P = 2Q ∈ {ϒ, ϒ} where ϒ or ϒ is the (2,2)-kernel. Writing Q = H (Q) = {Q 1 : Q 2 : Q 3 : Q 4 } and P = H (P) = {P 1 : P 2 : P 3 : P 4 }, then C Q,P : (X 1 : X 2 : X 3 : X 4 ) → (π 1 X 1 : π 2 X 2 : π 3 X 3 : π 4 X 4 )
where
Then the (2,2)-isogeny can be derived from [31] . Let Q be a point of order 4, P = 2Q and P ∈ {ϒ, ϒ}. Denote by ϕ P : K Sqr → K Sqr /{ϒ, ϒ} R → (S · H · C Q,P · H (R)) the full (2,2)-isogeny.
Evaluating an 2-isogeny needs 4m + 4s + 16a and computing an 2-isogeny curve costs 19m + 4s + 16a.
B. INTERNAL FUNCTIONS
Operation on Address: The function make − addr : {0, ..., d} × N → A takes as input a layer i ∈ {0, ..., d} and an index j ∈ N and returns a = (i, j mod 2 c+dh , 0) ∈ A.
The function incr − addr : A × N → A takes as input an address a = (i, j, λ) and an integer x and returns the address a = (i, j, λ + x) ∈ A.
L-Tree: The function L-tree: {0, 1} 2n × {0, 1} 2nl → {0, 1} 2n takes as input a supersingular curve E 0 and l leaves hashes x i ∈ {0, 1} 2n , and returns the associated L-tree root r ∈ {0, 1} 2n , defined by recurrence as follows. Merkle − auth 1 (x 0 , x 1 , j) = a 1 ← x j⊕1 where ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation on non-negative integers.
Merkle − auth h (x 0 , x 1 ..., x 2 h , j) is Octopus Authentication: The function Octopus − auth h :
, 1} 2n takes as input a supersingular curve E 0 , 2 h leaf hashes x i and k distinct octopus authentication nodes, and outputs the authentication path oct and the octopus root r ∈ {0, 1} 2n . It is defined by recurrence on h as:
Octopus − auth 0 (x 0 , j 1 ) = (∅, x 0 ), Octopus − auth h (x 0 , x 1 , ..., x 2 h , j 1 , ..., j k ) is computed as
.., j k ← unique( j 1 /2 , ..., j k /2 ); oct , r ← Octopus − auth h−1 (H (E 0 , x 0 ||x 1 ), ..., H (E 0 , x 2 h −1 ||x 2 h ), j 1 , ..., j k ); z 1 , ..., z 2k −k ← (j 1 ⊕ 1, ..., j k ⊕ 1)/(j 1 , ..., j k ); a 1 , ..., a 2k −k ← (x z 1 , ..., x 2k −k ); oct ← (a 1 , ..., a 2k −k ).
where unique() removes duplicates in a sequence, and A/B denotes the set difference. VOLUME 7, 2019 Octopus where Oct-layer() is defined by recurrence as:
, oct if oct = (a, oct) j 1 mod 2 = 0 H (E 0 , a||x 1 ), oct if oct = (a, oct) j 1 mod 2 = 1.
Oct − layer(x 1 , j 1 , x 2 , j 2 , ..., x k , j k , oct) is
H (E 0 , x 1 ||x 2 ), oct − layer(x 3 , j 3 , ..., x k , j k , oct)
if j 1 ⊕ 1 = j 2 ; ⊥ if j 1 ⊕ 1 = j 2 ∧ oct = ∅;
H (E 0 , x 1 ||a), oct − layer(x 2 , j 2 , ..., x k , j k , oct ) if oct = (a, oct) ∧ j 1 mod 2 = 0;
H (E 0 , a||x 1 ), oct − layer(x 2 , j 2 , ..., x k , j k , oct ) if oct = (a, oct) ∧ j 1 mod 2 = 1.
PORS: This function PORS: {0, 1} 2n × {0, 1} 2n → N × T k takes as input a supersingular curve E 0 and a hash m, and outputs a hyper-tree index λ ∈ N and k distinct indices x i as follows:
• Compute s = H (E 0 , m) mod 2 n . • Set address A = make − addr(d, 0) and pad A to n bits. • Compute an index λ = G(s, A) mod 2 c+dh . • Initialize X ← ∅ and j = 0. • While |X | < k do the following:
-increment j ← j + 1, -compute address A j = incr − addr(A, j) and pad A j to n bits, -compute u = G(s, A j ) and split u into v = n/ log 2 t blocks, namely u = u 1 ||u 2 ||...u v , -for i ∈ {1, ..., v}, if |X | < k update X ← X u i ,
• Compute (x 1 , ..., x k ) ← sorted(X ).
